| 2008 |
|---|
| 191 | | Lance Fortnow,
John Riedl,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Proceedings 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2008), Chicago, IL, USA, June 8-12, 2008
ACM 2008 |
| 190 | | Andrew Gilpin,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Expectation-Based Versus Potential-Aware Automated Abstraction in Imperfect Information Games: An Experimental Comparison Using Poker.
AAAI 2008: 1454-1457 |
| 189 | | William E. Walsh,
David C. Parkes,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Craig Boutilier:
Computing Reserve Prices and Identifying the Value Distribution in Real-world Auctions with Market Disruptions.
AAAI 2008: 1499-1502 |
| 188 | | Michael Benisch,
Norman M. Sadeh,
Tuomas Sandholm:
A Theory of Expressiveness in Mechanisms.
AAAI 2008: 17-23 |
| 187 | | Craig Boutilier,
David C. Parkes,
Tuomas Sandholm,
William E. Walsh:
Expressive Banner Ad Auctions and Model-Based Online Optimization for Clearing.
AAAI 2008: 30-37 |
| 186 | | Andrew Gilpin,
Javier Peña,
Tuomas Sandholm:
First-Order Algorithm with O(ln(1/e)) Convergence for e-Equilibrium in Two-Person Zero-Sum Games.
AAAI 2008: 75-82 |
| 185 | EE | Andrew Gilpin,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Solving two-person zero-sum repeated games of incomplete information.
AAMAS (2) 2008: 903-910 |
| 184 | EE | Andrew Gilpin,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Troels Bjerre Sørensen:
A heads-up no-limit Texas Hold'em poker player: discretized betting models and automatically generated equilibrium-finding programs.
AAMAS (2) 2008: 911-918 |
| 183 | EE | Sam Ganzfried,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Computing an approximate jam/fold equilibrium for 3-player no-limit Texas Hold'em tournaments.
AAMAS (2) 2008: 919-925 |
| 182 | EE | Andrew Gilpin,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Troels Bjerre Sørensen:
GS3 and Tartanian: game theory-based heads-up limit and no-limit Texas Hold'em poker-playing programs.
AAMAS (Demos) 2008: 1647-1648 |
| 181 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Tuomas Sandholm:
On the Existence of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auction Protocols.
ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 11(2): (2008) |
| 2007 |
|---|
| 180 | | Ulle Endriss,
Jérôme Lang,
Francesca Rossi,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Computational Issues in Social Choice, 21.10. - 26.10.2007
Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum fuer Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany 2007 |
| 179 | | Andrew Gilpin,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Troels Bjerre Sørensen:
Potential-Aware Automated Abstraction of Sequential Games, and Holistic Equilibrium Analysis of Texas Hold'em Poker.
AAAI 2007: 50-57 |
| 178 | | Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi,
Robert D. Kleinberg,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Automated Online Mechanism Design and Prophet Inequalities.
AAAI 2007: 58-65 |
| 177 | EE | Tuomas Sandholm:
Expressive Commerce and Its Application to Sourcing: How We Conducted $25 Billion of Generalized Combinatorial Auctions.
AAIM 2007: 426 |
| 176 | EE | Andrew Gilpin,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Better automated abstraction techniques for imperfect information games, with application to Texas Hold'em poker.
AAMAS 2007: 192 |
| 175 | EE | David J. Abraham,
Avrim Blum,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Clearing algorithms for barter exchange markets: enabling nationwide kidney exchanges.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2007: 295-304 |
| 174 | EE | Ulle Endriss,
Jérôme Lang,
Francesca Rossi,
Tuomas Sandholm:
07431 Abstracts Collection - Computational Issues in Social Choice.
Computational Issues in Social Choice 2007 |
| 173 | EE | Ulle Endriss,
Jérôme Lang,
Francesca Rossi,
Tuomas Sandholm:
07431 Executive Summary - Computational Issues in Social Choice.
Computational Issues in Social Choice 2007 |
| 172 | EE | Tuomas Sandholm:
Expressive commerce and its application to sourcing: how we conducted $35 billion of generalized combinatorial auctions.
ICEC 2007: 349-350 |
| 171 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Yoav Shoham:
Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions.
IJCAI 2007: 1207-1214 |
| 170 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Incremental Mechanism Design.
IJCAI 2007: 1251-1256 |
| 169 | EE | Tuomas Sandholm,
Vincent Conitzer,
Craig Boutilier:
Automated Design of Multistage Mechanisms.
IJCAI 2007: 1500-1506 |
| 168 | EE | Andrew Gilpin,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Information-Theoretic Approaches to Branching in Search.
IJCAI 2007: 2286-2292 |
| 167 | EE | Andrew Gilpin,
Samid Hoda,
Javier Peña,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Gradient-Based Algorithms for Finding Nash Equilibria in Extensive Form Games.
WINE 2007: 57-69 |
| 166 | EE | Tuomas Sandholm:
Perspectives on multiagent learning.
Artif. Intell. 171(7): 382-391 (2007) |
| 165 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Jérôme Lang:
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?.
J. ACM 54(3): 14 (2007) |
| 164 | EE | Andrew Gilpin,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Lossless abstraction of imperfect information games.
J. ACM 54(5): (2007) |
| 163 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents.
Machine Learning 67(1-2): 23-43 (2007) |
| 2006 |
|---|
| 162 | | Naoki Ohta,
Atsushi Iwasaki,
Makoto Yokoo,
Kohki Maruono,
Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments.
AAAI 2006 |
| 161 | | Andrew Gilpin,
Tuomas Sandholm:
A Competitive Texas Hold'em Poker Player via Automated Abstraction and Real-Time Equilibrium Computation.
AAAI 2006 |
| 160 | | Michael Benisch,
George B. Davis,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Algorithms for Rationalizability and CURB Sets.
AAAI 2006 |
| 159 | | Tuomas Sandholm:
Expressive Commerce and Its Application to Sourcing.
AAAI 2006 |
| 158 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate.
AAAI 2006 |
| 157 | EE | Tuomas Sandholm,
Andrew Gilpin:
Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation.
AAMAS 2006: 1127-1134 |
| 156 | EE | Andrew Gilpin,
Tuomas Sandholm:
A Texas Hold'em poker player based on automated abstraction and real-time equilibrium computation.
AAMAS 2006: 1453-1454 |
| 155 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges.
AAMAS 2006: 521-528 |
| 154 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
A technique for reducing normal-form games to compute a Nash equilibrium.
AAMAS 2006: 537-544 |
| 153 | EE | Andrew Gilpin,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Information-theoretic approaches to branching in search.
AAMAS 2006: 545-547 |
| 152 | EE | Andrew Gilpin,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Finding equilibria in large sequential games of imperfect information.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2006: 160-169 |
| 151 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Computing the optimal strategy to commit to.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2006: 82-90 |
| 150 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions.
Artif. Intell. 170(6-7): 607-619 (2006) |
| 149 | EE | Avrim Blum,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Martin Zinkevich:
Online algorithms for market clearing.
J. ACM 53(5): 845-879 (2006) |
| 2005 |
|---|
| 148 | | Daniel J. Lehmann,
Rudolf Müller,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Computing and Markets, 3.-7. January 2005
IBFI, Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany 2005 |
| 147 | | Andrew Gilpin,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Optimal Rhode Island Hold'em Poker.
AAAI 2005: 1684-1685 |
| 146 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Paolo Santi:
Combinatorial Auctions with k-wise Dependent Valuations.
AAAI 2005: 248-254 |
| 145 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Expressive Negotiation in Settings with Externalities.
AAAI 2005: 255-260 |
| 144 | | Anton Likhodedov,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Approximating Revenue-Maximizing Combinatorial Auctions.
AAAI 2005: 267-274 |
| 143 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
A Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion and Computational Methods for Applying It.
AAAI 2005: 483-488 |
| 142 | | Tuomas Sandholm,
Andrew Gilpin,
Vincent Conitzer:
Mixed-Integer Programming Methods for Finding Nash Equilibria.
AAAI 2005: 495-501 |
| 141 | | Makoto Yokoo,
Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Naoki Ohta,
Atsushi Iwasaki:
Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments.
AAAI 2005: 509-515 |
| 140 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Decentralized voting with unconditional privacy.
AAMAS 2005: 357-364 |
| 139 | EE | Kate Larson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Mechanism design and deliberative agents.
AAMAS 2005: 650-656 |
| 138 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Communication complexity of common voting rules.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2005: 78-87 |
| 137 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of (iterated) dominance.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2005: 88-97 |
| 136 | EE | Daniel J. Lehmann,
Rudolf Müller,
Tuomas Sandholm:
05011 Abstracts Collection - Computing and Markets.
Computing and Markets 2005 |
| 135 | EE | Daniel J. Lehmann,
Rudolf Müller,
Tuomas Sandholm:
05011 Executive Summary - Computing and Markets.
Computing and Markets 2005 |
| 134 | EE | Tuomas Sandholm:
Automated Mechanism Design.
Computing and Markets 2005 |
| 133 | EE | Tuomas Sandholm,
Andrew Gilpin:
Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal Auctions Without Full Valuation Revelation.
Computing and Markets 2005 |
| 132 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Yoav Shoham:
Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions.
Computing and Markets 2005 |
| 131 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Efficient Privacy-Preserving Protocols for Multi-unit Auctions.
Financial Cryptography 2005: 298-312 |
| 130 | EE | Makoto Yokoo,
Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Naoki Ohta,
Atsushi Iwasaki:
Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments.
IJCAI 2005: 1668-1669 |
| 129 | EE | Makoto Yokoo,
Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Naoki Ohta,
Atsushi Iwasaki:
A New Solution Concept for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments.
JSAI Workshops 2005: 53-64 |
| 128 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Unconditional privacy in social choice.
TARK 2005: 207-218 |
| 127 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators.
UAI 2005: 145-152 |
| 2004 |
|---|
| 126 | | Craig Boutilier,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Rob Shields:
Eliciting Bid Taker Non-price Preferences in (Combinatorial) Auctions.
AAAI 2004: 204-211 |
| 125 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Jonathan Derryberry,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Combinatorial Auctions with Structured Item Graphs.
AAAI 2004: 212-218 |
| 124 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Computing Shapley Values, Manipulating Value Division Schemes, and Checking Core Membership in Multi-Issue Domains.
AAAI 2004: 219-225 |
| 123 | | Anton Likhodedov,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Methods for Boosting Revenue in Combinatorial Auctions.
AAAI 2004: 232-237 |
| 122 | | Kate Larson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Using Performance Profile Trees to Improve Deliberation Control.
AAAI 2004: 73-79 |
| 121 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
An Algorithm for Automatically Designing Deterministic Mechanisms without Payments.
AAMAS 2004: 128-135 |
| 120 | EE | Anshul Kothari,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Subhash Suri:
Solving Combinatorial Exchanges: Optimality via a Few Partial Bids.
AAMAS 2004: 1418-1419 |
| 119 | EE | Wolfram Conen,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Anonymous Pricing of Efficient Allocations in Combinatorial Economies.
AAMAS 2004: 254-260 |
| 118 | EE | Benoît Hudson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Effectiveness of Query Types and Policies for Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions.
AAMAS 2004: 386-393 |
| 117 | EE | Kate Larson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Experiments on Deliberation Equilibria in Auctions.
AAMAS 2004: 394-401 |
| 116 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Im)Possibility of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auctions.
AAMAS 2004: 810-817 |
| 115 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 132-141 |
| 114 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Computational criticisms of the revelation principle.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 262-263 |
| 113 | EE | Kate Larson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Strategic deliberation and truthful revelation: an impossibility result.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 264-265 |
| 112 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with vcg payments.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 266-267 |
| 111 | EE | Anton Likhodedov,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency in multi-unit auctions.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 268-269 |
| 110 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Expressive negotiation over donations to charities.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 51-60 |
| 109 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Revenue Failures and Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges with VCG Payments.
AMEC 2004: 1-14 |
| 108 | EE | Kate Larson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Designing Auctions for Deliberative Agents.
AMEC 2004: 87-100 |
| 107 | EE | Paolo Santi,
Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Towards a Characterization of Polynomial Preference Elicitation with Value Queries in Combinatorial Auctions (Extended Abstract).
COLT 2004: 1-16 |
| 106 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games.
ICML 2004 |
| 105 | EE | Avrim Blum,
Jeffrey C. Jackson,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Martin Zinkevich:
Preference Elicitation and Query Learning.
Journal of Machine Learning Research 5: 649-667 (2004) |
| 2003 |
|---|
| 104 | EE | Benoît Hudson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Generalizing preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions.
AAMAS 2003: 1014-1015 |
| 103 | EE | Kate Larson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Miscomputing ratio: social cost of selfish computing.
AAMAS 2003: 273-280 |
| 102 | EE | Martin Zinkevich,
Avrim Blum,
Tuomas Sandholm:
On polynomial-time preference elicitation with value queries.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 176-185 |
| 101 | EE | Wolfram Conen,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 196-197 |
| 100 | EE | Anton Likhodedov,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Auction mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 212-213 |
| 99 | EE | Benoît Hudson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Using value queries in combinatorial auctions.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 226-227 |
| 98 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 230-231 |
| 97 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 232-233 |
| 96 | EE | Anshul Kothari,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Subhash Suri:
Solving combinatorial exchanges: optimality via a few partial bids.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 236-237 |
| 95 | EE | Tuomas Sandholm,
Andrew Gilpin:
Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal Auctions Without Full Valuation Revelation.
AMEC 2003: 73-91 |
| 94 | EE | Anton Likhodedov,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Mechanism for Optimally Trading Off Revenue and Efficiency in Multi-unit Auctions.
AMEC 2003: 92-108 |
| 93 | EE | Sviatoslav Braynov,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Auctions with Untrustworthy Bidders.
CEC 2003: 363- |
| 92 | EE | Avrim Blum,
Jeffrey C. Jackson,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Martin Zinkevich:
Preference Elicitation and Query Learning.
COLT 2003: 13-25 |
| 91 | EE | Tuomas Sandholm:
Automated Mechanism Design: A New Application Area for Search Algorithms.
CP 2003: 19-36 |
| 90 | EE | Tuomas Sandholm:
Terminating Decision Algorithms Optimally.
CP 2003: 950-955 |
| 89 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting.
ICEC 2003: 17-24 |
| 88 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents.
ICML 2003: 83-90 |
| 87 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games.
ICML 2003: 91-98 |
| 86 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems.
IJCAI 2003: 1099-1106 |
| 85 | | Tuomas Sandholm:
Making Markets and Democracy Work: A Story of Incentives and Computing.
IJCAI 2003: 1649- |
| 84 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core.
IJCAI 2003: 613-618 |
| 83 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria.
IJCAI 2003: 765-771 |
| 82 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard.
IJCAI 2003: 781-788 |
| 81 | EE | Xiao Feng Wang,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Learning Near-Pareto-Optimal Conventions in Polynomial Time.
NIPS 2003 |
| 80 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Jérôme Lang,
Tuomas Sandholm:
How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?
TARK 2003: 201-214 |
| 79 | EE | Subhash Suri,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Priyank Ramesh Warkhede:
Compressing Two-Dimensional Routing Tables.
Algorithmica 35(4): 287-300 (2003) |
| 78 | EE | Tuomas Sandholm,
Subhash Suri:
BOB: Improved winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations.
Artif. Intell. 145(1-2): 33-58 (2003) |
| 77 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems
CoRR cs.AI/0307017: (2003) |
| 76 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents
CoRR cs.GT/0307002: (2003) |
| 75 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Jérôme Lang,
Tuomas Sandholm:
How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?
CoRR cs.GT/0307003: (2003) |
| 74 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games
CoRR cs.GT/0307006: (2003) |
| 73 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core
CoRR cs.GT/0307016: (2003) |
| 72 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard
CoRR cs.GT/0307018: (2003) |
| 2002 |
|---|
| 71 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates.
AAAI/IAAI 2002: 314-319 |
| 70 | | Tuomas Sandholm,
Xiao Feng Wang:
(Im)possibility of Safe Exchange Mechanism Design.
AAAI/IAAI 2002: 338-344 |
| 69 | | Wolfram Conen,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Partial-Revelation VCG Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions.
AAAI/IAAI 2002: 367-372 |
| 68 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness.
AAAI/IAAI 2002: 392-397 |
| 67 | EE | Kate Larson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
An alternating offers bargaining model for computationally limited agents.
AAMAS 2002: 135-142 |
| 66 | EE | Kate Larson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Bidders with hard valuation problems.
AAMAS 2002: 160-161 |
| 65 | EE | Wolfram Conen,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions.
AAMAS 2002: 168-169 |
| 64 | EE | Sviatoslav Braynov,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Incentive compatible mechanism for trust revelation.
AAMAS 2002: 310-311 |
| 63 | EE | Tuomas Sandholm,
Subhash Suri,
Andrew Gilpin,
David Levine:
Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations.
AAMAS 2002: 69-76 |
| 62 | EE | Wolfram Conen,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Differential -Revelation VCG Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions.
AMEC 2002: 34-51 |
| 61 | EE | Benoît Hudson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions.
AMEC 2002: 69-86 |
| 60 | EE | Tuomas Sandholm,
Subhash Suri:
Market Clearing with Supply and Demand Curves.
ISAAC 2002: 600-611 |
| 59 | EE | Xiaofeng Wang,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Reinforcement Learning to Play an Optimal Nash Equilibrium in Team Markov Games.
NIPS 2002: 1571-1578 |
| 58 | EE | Avrim Blum,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Martin Zinkevich:
Online algorithms for market clearing.
SODA 2002: 971-980 |
| 57 | | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of Mechanism Design.
UAI 2002: 103-110 |
| 56 | | Tuomas Sandholm,
Victor R. Lesser:
Leveled-Commitment Contracting: A Backtracking Instrument for Multiagent Systems.
AI Magazine 23(3): 89-100 (2002) |
| 55 | EE | Tuomas Sandholm:
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions.
Artif. Intell. 135(1-2): 1-54 (2002) |
| 54 | EE | Tuomas Sandholm,
Yunhong Zhou:
Surplus equivalence of leveled commitment contracts.
Artif. Intell. 142(2): 239-264 (2002) |
| 53 | EE | Benoît Hudson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions
CoRR cs.GT/0205066: (2002) |
| 52 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness
CoRR cs.GT/0205073: (2002) |
| 51 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria
CoRR cs.GT/0205074: (2002) |
| 50 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of Mechanism Design
CoRR cs.GT/0205075: (2002) |
| 49 | EE | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates
CoRR cs.GT/0205076: (2002) |
| 48 | | Sviatoslav Braynov,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Contracting With Uncertain Level Of Trust.
Computational Intelligence 18(4): 501-514 (2002) |
| 47 | | Tuomas Sandholm:
eMediator: A Next Generation Electronic Commerce Server.
Computational Intelligence 18(4): 656-676 (2002) |
| 2001 |
|---|
| 46 | EE | Wolfram Conen,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2001: 256-259 |
| 45 | | Tuomas Sandholm,
Subhash Suri,
Andrew Gilpin,
David Levine:
CABOB: A Fast Optimal Algorithm for Combinatorial Auctions.
IJCAI 2001: 1102-1108 |
| 44 | | Tuomas Sandholm,
Subhash Suri:
Market Clearability.
IJCAI 2001: 1145-1151 |
| 43 | EE | Kate Larson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium.
Artif. Intell. 132(2): 183-217 (2001) |
| 2000 |
|---|
| 42 | | Kate Larson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Deliberation in Equilibrium: Bargaining in Computationally Complex Problems.
AAAI/IAAI 2000: 48-55 |
| 41 | | Tuomas Sandholm,
Subhash Suri:
Improved Algorithms for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions and Generalizations.
AAAI/IAAI 2000: 90-97 |
| 40 | EE | Tuomas Sandholm:
eMediator: a next generation electronic commerce server.
Agents 2000: 341-348 |
| 39 | EE | Martin Andersson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Contract Type Sequencing for Reallocative Negotiation.
ICDCS 2000: 154-160 |
| 38 | EE | Tuomas Sandholm,
Yunhong Zhou:
Surplus Equivalence of Leveled Commitment Contracts.
ICMAS 2000: 247-254 |
| 37 | EE | Tuomas Sandholm,
Vincent Ferrandon:
Safe Exchange Planner.
ICMAS 2000: 255-262 |
| 36 | EE | Sviatoslav Brainov,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Reasoning About Others: Representing and Processing Infinite Belief Hierarchies.
ICMAS 2000: 71-78 |
| 35 | EE | Subhash Suri,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Priyank Ramesh Warkhede:
Optimal Flow Aggregation.
SWAT 2000: 462-475 |
| 34 | | Tuomas Sandholm:
Agents in Electronic Commerce: Component Technologies for Automated Negation and Coalition Formation.
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 3(1): 73-96 (2000) |
| 33 | EE | Tuomas Sandholm:
Approaches to winner determination in combinatorial auctions.
Decision Support Systems 28(1-2): 165-176 (2000) |
| 32 | EE | Tuomas Sandholm,
Qianbo Huai:
Nomad: Mobile Agent System for an Internet-Based Auction House.
IEEE Internet Computing 4(2): 80-86 (2000) |
| 31 | | Kate Larson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Anytime coalition structure generation: an average case study.
J. Exp. Theor. Artif. Intell. 12(1): 23-42 (2000) |
| 1999 |
|---|
| 30 | | Sviatoslav Brainov,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Power, Dependence and Stability in Multiagent Plans.
AAAI/IAAI 1999: 11-16 |
| 29 | | Martin Andersson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Time-Quality Tradeoffs in Reallocative Negotiation with Combinatorial Contract Types.
AAAI/IAAI 1999: 3-10 |
| 28 | | Tuomas Sandholm,
Nir Vulkan:
Bargaining with Deadlines.
AAAI/IAAI 1999: 44-51 |
| 27 | | Tuomas Sandholm:
eMediator: a Next Generation Electronic Commerce Server.
AAAI/IAAI 1999: 923-924 |
| 26 | EE | Sviatoslav Brainov,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Contracting with uncertain level of trust.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 1999: 15-21 |
| 25 | EE | Kate Larson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Anytime Coalition Structure Generation: An Average Case Study.
Agents 1999: 40-47 |
| 24 | | Tuomas Sandholm,
Sandeep Sikka,
Samphel Norden:
Algorithms for Optimizing Leveled Commitment Contracts.
IJCAI 1999: 535-541 |
| 23 | | Tuomas Sandholm:
An Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions.
IJCAI 1999: 542-547 |
| 22 | EE | Tuomas Sandholm,
Kate Larson,
Martin Andersson,
Onn Shehory,
Fernando Tohmé:
Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees.
Artif. Intell. 111(1-2): 209-238 (1999) |
| 21 | EE | Tuomas Sandholm:
Automated Negotiation.
Commun. ACM 42(3): 84-85 (1999) |
| 20 | EE | Fernando Tohmé,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Coalition Formation Processes with Belief Revision among Bounded-rational Self-interested Agents.
J. Log. Comput. 9(6): 793-815 (1999) |
| 1998 |
|---|
| 19 | | Martin Andersson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Leveled Commitment Contracts with Myopic and Strategic Agents.
AAAI/IAAI 1998: 38-45 |
| 18 | | Tuomas Sandholm,
Kate Larson,
Martin Andersson,
Onn Shehory,
Fernando Tohmé:
Anytime Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees.
AAAI/IAAI 1998: 46-53 |
| 17 | EE | Martin Andersson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Sequencing of Contract Types for Anytime Task Reallocation.
AMET 1998: 54-69 |
| 16 | EE | Hyacinth S. Nwana,
Jeffrey S. Rosenschein,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Carles Sierra,
Pattie Maes,
Robert H. Guttman:
Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: Issues, Challenges and Some Viewpoints.
Agents 1998: 189-196 |
| 15 | EE | Tuomas Sandholm:
Agents in Electronic Commerce: Component Technologies for Automated Negation and Coalition Formation.
CIA 1998: 113-134 |
| 14 | EE | Tuomas Sandholm:
Agents in Electronic Commerce: Component Technologies for Automated Negotiation and Coalition Formation.
ICMAS 1998: 10-11 |
| 13 | EE | Martin Andersson,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Leveled Commitment Contracting among Myopic Individually Rational Agents.
ICMAS 1998: 26-33 |
| 12 | EE | Tuomas Sandholm,
Kate Larson,
Martin Andersson,
Onn Shehory,
Fernando Tohmé:
Anytime Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees
CoRR cs.MA/9810005: (1998) |
| 1997 |
|---|
| 11 | | Tuomas Sandholm,
Fredrik Ygge:
On the Gains and Losses of Speculation in Equilibrium Markets.
IJCAI (1) 1997: 632-639 |
| 10 | EE | Tuomas Sandholm,
Victor R. Lesser:
Coalitions Among Computationally Bounded Agents.
Artif. Intell. 94(1-2): 99-137 (1997) |
| 9 | | Tuomas Sandholm:
Unenforced E-Commerce Transactions.
IEEE Internet Computing 1(6): 47-54 (1997) |
| 1996 |
|---|
| 8 | | Tuomas Sandholm,
Victor R. Lesser:
Advantages of a Leveled Commitment Contracting Protocol.
AAAI/IAAI, Vol. 1 1996: 126-133 |
| 7 | | Tuomas Sandholm:
A Second Order Parameter for 3SAT.
AAAI/IAAI, Vol. 1 1996: 259-265 |
| 1995 |
|---|
| 6 | | Tuomas Sandholm,
Robert H. Crites:
On Multiagent Q-Learning in a Semi-Competitive Domain.
Adaption and Learning in Multi-Agent Systems 1995: 191-205 |
| 5 | | Tuomas Sandholm,
Victor R. Lesser:
Issues in Automated Negotiation and Electronic Commerce: Extending the Contract Net Framework.
ICMAS 1995: 328-335 |
| 4 | | Tuomas Sandholm,
Victor R. Lesser:
Coalition Formation among Bounded Rational Agents.
IJCAI (1) 1995: 662-671 |
| 3 | | Tuomas Sandholm,
Victor R. Lesser:
Equilibrium Analysis of the Possibilities of Unenforced Exchange in Multiagent Systems.
IJCAI (1) 1995: 694-703 |
| 1994 |
|---|
| 2 | | Daniel E. Neiman,
David W. Hildum,
Victor R. Lesser,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Exploiting Meta-Level information in a Distributed Scheduling System.
AAAI 1994: 394-400 |
| 1993 |
|---|
| 1 | | Tuomas Sandholm:
An Implementation of the Contract Net Protocol Based on Marginal Cost Calculations.
AAAI 1993: 256-262 |
