| 2009 |
|---|
| 72 | EE | David C. Parkes:
When Analysis Fails: Heuristic Mechanism Design via Self-correcting Procedures.
SOFSEM 2009: 62-66 |
| 71 | EE | Shien Jin Ong,
David C. Parkes,
Alon Rosen,
Salil P. Vadhan:
Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority.
TCC 2009: 36-53 |
| 70 | EE | Adam I. Juda,
David C. Parkes:
An options-based solution to the sequential auction problem.
Artif. Intell. 173(7-8): 876-899 (2009) |
| 69 | EE | Saul Youssef,
John Brunelle,
John Huth,
David C. Parkes,
Margo I. Seltzer,
Jim Shank:
Minimal Economic Distributed Computing
CoRR abs/0902.4730: (2009) |
| 68 | EE | Joan Feigenbaum,
David C. Parkes,
David M. Pennock:
Computational challenges in e-commerce.
Commun. ACM 52(1): 70-74 (2009) |
| 2008 |
|---|
| 67 | | Lin Padgham,
David C. Parkes,
Jörg Müller,
Simon Parsons:
7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2008), Estoril, Portugal, May 12-16, 2008, Volume 1
IFAAMAS 2008 |
| 66 | | Lin Padgham,
David C. Parkes,
Jörg Müller,
Simon Parsons:
7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2008), Estoril, Portugal, May 12-16, 2008, Volume 2
IFAAMAS 2008 |
| 65 | | Lin Padgham,
David C. Parkes,
Jörg Müller,
Simon Parsons:
7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2008), Estoril, Portugal, May 12-16, 2008, Volume 3
IFAAMAS 2008 |
| 64 | | Sébastien Lahaie,
David C. Parkes,
David M. Pennock:
An Expressive Auction Design for Online Display Advertising.
AAAI 2008: 108-113 |
| 63 | | William E. Walsh,
David C. Parkes,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Craig Boutilier:
Computing Reserve Prices and Identifying the Value Distribution in Real-world Auctions with Market Disruptions.
AAAI 2008: 1499-1502 |
| 62 | | Sven Seuken,
Ruggiero Cavallo,
David C. Parkes:
Partially Synchronized DEC-MDPs in Dynamic Mechanism Design.
AAAI 2008: 162-169 |
| 61 | | Craig Boutilier,
David C. Parkes,
Tuomas Sandholm,
William E. Walsh:
Expressive Banner Ad Auctions and Model-Based Online Optimization for Clearing.
AAAI 2008: 30-37 |
| 60 | | Ruggiero Cavallo,
David C. Parkes:
Efficient Metadeliberation Auctions.
AAAI 2008: 50-56 |
| 59 | | Erik G. Schultink,
Ruggiero Cavallo,
David C. Parkes:
Economic Hierarchical Q-Learning.
AAAI 2008: 689-695 |
| 58 | EE | Sébastien Lahaie,
David C. Parkes:
On the communication requirements of verifying the VCG outcome.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2008: 78-87 |
| 57 | EE | Mark Klein,
Gabriel A. Moreno,
David C. Parkes,
Daniel Plakosh,
Sven Seuken,
Kurt C. Wallnau:
Handling interdependent values in an auction mechanism for bandwidth allocation in tactical data networks.
NetEcon 2008: 73-78 |
| 56 | EE | Sevan G. Ficici,
David C. Parkes,
Avi Pfeffer:
Learning and Solving Many-Player Games through a Cluster-Based Representation.
UAI 2008: 187-195 |
| 55 | EE | Shaili Jain,
David C. Parkes:
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Games with a Purpose.
WINE 2008: 342-350 |
| 54 | EE | David C. Parkes,
Michael O. Rabin,
Stuart M. Shieber,
Christopher Thorpe:
Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions.
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications 7(3): 294-312 (2008) |
| 2007 |
|---|
| 53 | | Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason,
David C. Parkes,
Paul Resnick:
Proceedings 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2007), San Diego, California, USA, June 11-15, 2007
ACM 2007 |
| 52 | | David C. Parkes,
Quang Duong:
An Ironing-Based Approach to Adaptive Online Mechanism Design in Single-Valued Domains.
AAAI 2007: 94-101 |
| 51 | EE | Florin Constantin,
Takayuki Ito,
David C. Parkes:
Online auctions for bidders with interdependent values.
AAMAS 2007: 110 |
| 50 | EE | Florin Constantin,
David C. Parkes:
On Revenue-Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values.
AMEC/TADA 2007: 1-15 |
| 49 | EE | Christopher Thorpe,
David C. Parkes:
Cryptographic Securities Exchanges.
Financial Cryptography 2007: 163-178 |
| 48 | EE | Jacomo Corbo,
Antoni Calvó-Armengol,
David C. Parkes:
The Importance of Network Topology in Local Contribution Games.
WINE 2007: 388-395 |
| 47 | EE | Jonathan Bredin,
David C. Parkes,
Quang Duong:
Chain: A Dynamic Double Auction Framework for Matching Patient Agents.
J. Artif. Intell. Res. (JAIR) 30: 133-179 (2007) |
| 2006 |
|---|
| 46 | EE | Takayuki Ito,
David C. Parkes:
Instantiating the contingent bids model of truthful interdependent value auctions.
AAMAS 2006: 1151-1158 |
| 45 | EE | Adrian Petcu,
Boi Faltings,
David C. Parkes:
MDPOP: faithful distributed implementation of efficient social choice problems.
AAMAS 2006: 1397-1404 |
| 44 | EE | Adam I. Juda,
David C. Parkes:
The sequential auction problem on eBay: an empirical analysis and a solution.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2006: 180-189 |
| 43 | EE | Laura Kang,
David C. Parkes:
Passive verification of the strategyproofness of mechanisms in open environments.
ICEC 2006: 19-30 |
| 42 | EE | David C. Parkes,
Michael O. Rabin,
Stuart M. Shieber,
C. A. Thorpe:
Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions.
ICEC 2006: 70-81 |
| 41 | EE | Ruggiero Cavallo,
David C. Parkes,
Satinder P. Singh:
Optimal Coordinated Planning Amongst Self-Interested Agents with Private State.
UAI 2006 |
| 40 | EE | Jacomo Corbo,
Antoni Calvó-Armengol,
David C. Parkes:
A study of Nash equilibrium in contribution games for peer-to-peer networks.
Operating Systems Review 40(3): 61-66 (2006) |
| 2005 |
|---|
| 39 | EE | Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi,
Robert D. Kleinberg,
Mohammad Mahdian,
David C. Parkes:
Online auctions with re-usable goods.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2005: 165-174 |
| 38 | EE | David C. Parkes,
Ruggiero Cavallo,
Nick Elprin,
Adam I. Juda,
Sébastien Lahaie,
Benjamin Lubin,
Loizos Michael,
Jeffrey Shneidman,
Hassan Sultan:
ICE: an iterative combinatorial exchange.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2005: 249-258 |
| 37 | | David C. Parkes:
Computational Mechanism Design: An AI Agenda.
BNAIC 2005: 3-10 |
| 36 | EE | Sébastien Lahaie,
Florin Constantin,
David C. Parkes:
More on the Power of Demand Queries in Combinatorial Auctions: Learning Atomic Languages and Handling Incentives.
IJCAI 2005: 959-964 |
| 35 | EE | Geoffrey Mainland,
David C. Parkes,
Matt Welsh:
Decentralized, Adaptive Resource Allocation for Sensor Networks.
NSDI 2005 |
| 34 | EE | Jacomo Corbo,
David C. Parkes:
The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network formation.
PODC 2005: 99-107 |
| 33 | EE | Jonathan Bredin,
David C. Parkes:
Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions.
UAI 2005: 50-59 |
| 32 | EE | David C. Parkes:
Auction design with costly preference elicitation.
Ann. Math. Artif. Intell. 44(3): 269-302 (2005) |
| 31 | EE | David C. Parkes:
Special Issue of Decision Support Systems on the Fourth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce.
Decision Support Systems 39(1): 1-2 (2005) |
| 30 | EE | Anshul Kothari,
David C. Parkes,
Subhash Suri:
Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multiunit auctions.
Decision Support Systems 39(1): 105-121 (2005) |
| 2004 |
|---|
| 29 | | Peyman Faratin,
David C. Parkes,
Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguilar,
William E. Walsh:
Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V, Designing Mechanisms and Systems, AAMAS 2003 Workshop, AMEC 2003, Melbourne, Australia, July 15, 2003, Revised Selected Papers
Springer 2004 |
| 28 | | David C. Parkes,
Grant Schoenebeck:
GROWRANGE: Anytime VCG-Based Mechanisms.
AAAI 2004: 34-41 |
| 27 | EE | David C. Parkes,
Jeffrey Shneidman:
Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism.
AAMAS 2004: 261-268 |
| 26 | EE | Sébastien Lahaie,
David C. Parkes:
Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 180-188 |
| 25 | EE | Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi,
Robert D. Kleinberg,
David C. Parkes:
Adaptive limited-supply online auctions.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 71-80 |
| 24 | EE | Geoffrey Mainland,
Laura Kang,
Sébastien Lahaie,
David C. Parkes,
Matt Welsh:
Using virtual markets to program global behavior in sensor networks.
ACM SIGOPS European Workshop 2004: 1 |
| 23 | EE | Loizos Michael,
David C. Parkes,
Avi Pfeffer:
Specifying and Monitoring Market Mechanisms Using Rights and Obligations.
AMEC 2004: 188-201 |
| 22 | EE | Adam I. Juda,
David C. Parkes:
An Options-Based Method to Solve the Composability Problem in Sequential Auctions.
AMEC 2004: 44-58 |
| 21 | EE | David C. Parkes,
Satinder P. Singh,
Dimah Yanovsky:
Approximately Efficient Online Mechanism Design.
NIPS 2004 |
| 20 | EE | Jeffrey Shneidman,
David C. Parkes:
Specification faithfulness in networks with rational nodes.
PODC 2004: 88-97 |
| 2003 |
|---|
| 19 | EE | Anshul Kothari,
David C. Parkes,
Subhash Suri:
Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multi-unit auctions.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 166-175 |
| 18 | EE | Aditya V. Sunderam,
David C. Parkes:
Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 214-215 |
| 17 | EE | Chaki Ng,
David C. Parkes,
Margo I. Seltzer:
Virtual worlds: fast and strategyproof auctions for dynamic resource allocation.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 238-239 |
| 16 | EE | Eric J. Friedman,
David C. Parkes:
Pricing WiFi at Starbucks: issues in online mechanism design.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 240-241 |
| 15 | EE | Jeffrey Shneidman,
David C. Parkes:
Using redundancy to improve robustness of distributed mechanism implementations.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 276-277 |
| 14 | EE | William E. Walsh,
David C. Parkes,
Rajarshi Das:
Choosing Samples to Compute Heuristic-Strategy Nash Equilibrium.
AMEC 2003: 109-123 |
| 13 | EE | Jeffrey Shneidman,
David C. Parkes:
Rationality and Self-Interest in Peer to Peer Networks.
IPTPS 2003: 139-148 |
| 12 | EE | David C. Parkes,
Satinder P. Singh:
An MDP-Based Approach to Online Mechanism Design.
NIPS 2003 |
| 11 | EE | Rajdeep K. Dash,
Nicholas R. Jennings,
David C. Parkes:
Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms.
IEEE Intelligent Systems 18(6): 40-47 (2003) |
| 2002 |
|---|
| 10 | | Julian A. Padget,
Onn Shehory,
David C. Parkes,
Norman M. Sadeh,
William E. Walsh:
Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems, AAMAS 2002 Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce, Bologna, Italy, July 16, 2002, Revised Papers
Springer 2002 |
| 9 | EE | David C. Parkes:
Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation Combinatorial Auctions.
AMEC 2002: 103-122 |
| 8 | EE | David C. Parkes:
Conference report: the third ACM conference on electronic commerce.
SIGecom Exchanges 3(1): 57-61 (2002) |
| 2001 |
|---|
| 7 | EE | David C. Parkes,
Lyle H. Ungar:
An auction-based method for decentralized train scheduling.
Agents 2001: 43-50 |
| 6 | | David C. Parkes,
Jayant Kalagnanam,
Marta Eso:
Achieving Budget-Balance with Vickrey-Based Payment Schemes in Exchanges.
IJCAI 2001: 1161-1168 |
| 2000 |
|---|
| 5 | | David C. Parkes,
Lyle H. Ungar:
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice.
AAAI/IAAI 2000: 74-81 |
| 4 | | David C. Parkes,
Lyle H. Ungar:
Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment.
AAAI/IAAI 2000: 82-89 |
| 1999 |
|---|
| 3 | EE | David C. Parkes:
iBundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 1999: 148-157 |
| 2 | | David C. Parkes:
Optimal Auction Design for Agents with Hard Valuation Problems.
Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce (IJCAI Workshop) 1999: 206-219 |
| 1998 |
|---|
| 1 | EE | David C. Parkes,
Lyle H. Ungar,
Dean P. Foster:
Accounting for Cognitive Costs in On-Line Auction Design.
AMET 1998: 25-40 |
