Coauthor Index - Ask others: ACM DL/Guide - CiteSeer - CSB - Google - MSN - Yahoo

Home Page

2009 | ||
---|---|---|

80 | EE | Sayan Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munagala, Lirong Xia: Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions CoRR abs/0904.3501: (2009) |

2008 | ||

79 | Liad Wagman, Vincent Conitzer: Optimal False-Name-Proof Voting Rules with Costly Voting. AAAI 2008: 190-195 | |

78 | Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer: Determining Possible and Necessary Winners under Common Voting Rules Given Partial Orders. AAAI 2008: 196-201 | |

77 | Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang: Voting on Multiattribute Domains with Cyclic Preferential Dependencies. AAAI 2008: 202-207 | |

76 | EE | Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer: Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms. AAMAS (2) 2008: 1039-1046 |

75 | EE | Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer: Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms. AAMAS (2) 2008: 1047-1054 |

74 | EE | Liad Wagman, Vincent Conitzer: Strategic betting for competitive agents. AAMAS (2) 2008: 847-854 |

73 | EE | Naoki Ohta, Vincent Conitzer, Yasufumi Satoh, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo: Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments. AAMAS (2) 2008: 927-934 |

72 | EE | Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer: Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2008: 109-118 |

71 | EE | Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer: Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2008: 210-219 |

70 | EE | Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer: A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2008: 99-108 |

69 | EE | Vincent Conitzer: Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules. WINE 2008: 295-306 |

68 | EE | Krzysztof R. Apt, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo, Evangelos Markakis: Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms. WINE 2008: 426-437 |

67 | EE | Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer, Kamal Jain: An "Ethical" Game-Theoretic Solution Concept for Two-Player Perfect-Information Games. WINE 2008: 696-707 |

66 | EE | Krzysztof R. Apt, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo, Evangelos Markakis: Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms CoRR abs/0810.2865: (2008) |

2007 | ||

65 | EE | Vincent Conitzer: Invited talk by winner of IFAAMAS Victor Lesser Distinguished Dissertation Award. AAMAS 2007: 253 |

64 | EE | Vincent Conitzer: Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries. AAMAS 2007: 65 |

63 | EE | Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer: Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2007: 30-39 |

62 | EE | Vincent Conitzer: Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules. Computational Social Systems and the Internet 2007 |

61 | EE | Vincent Conitzer: Limited Verification of Identities to Induce False-Name-Proofness. Computational Social Systems and the Internet 2007 |

60 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Incremental Mechanism Design. IJCAI 2007: 1251-1256 |

59 | EE | Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer, Craig Boutilier: Automated Design of Multistage Mechanisms. IJCAI 2007: 1500-1506 |

58 | EE | Vincent Conitzer: Limited verification of identities to induce false-name-proofness. TARK 2007: 102-111 |

57 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Jérôme Lang: When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate&quest;. J. ACM 54(3): 14 (2007) |

56 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents. Machine Learning 67(1-2): 23-43 (2007) |

55 | EE | Vincent Conitzer: Editor's introduction. SIGecom Exchanges 7(1): 1-2 (2007) |

54 | EE | Vincent Conitzer: Editor's puzzle: combinatorial auction winner determination. SIGecom Exchanges 7(1): 69-70 (2007) |

2006 | ||

53 | Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Kohki Maruono, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. AAAI 2006 | |

52 | Vincent Conitzer: Computing Slater Rankings Using Similarities among Candidates. AAAI 2006 | |

51 | Vincent Conitzer, Andrew J. Davenport, Jayant Kalagnanam: Improved Bounds for Computing Kemeny Rankings. AAAI 2006 | |

50 | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate. AAAI 2006 | |

49 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges. AAMAS 2006: 521-528 |

48 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: A technique for reducing normal-form games to compute a Nash equilibrium. AAMAS 2006: 537-544 |

47 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Computing the optimal strategy to commit to. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2006: 82-90 |

46 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Nikesh Garera: Learning algorithms for online principal-agent problems (and selling goods online). ICML 2006: 209-216 |

45 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions. Artif. Intell. 170(6-7): 607-619 (2006) |

2005 | ||

44 | Vincent Conitzer: Computational Aspects of Mechanism Design. AAAI 2005: 1642-1643 | |

43 | Vincent Conitzer,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Paolo Santi:
Combinatorial Auctions with k-wise Dependent Valuations.
AAAI 2005: 248-254 | |

42 | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Expressive Negotiation in Settings with Externalities. AAAI 2005: 255-260 | |

41 | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: A Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion and Computational Methods for Applying It. AAAI 2005: 483-488 | |

40 | Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin, Vincent Conitzer: Mixed-Integer Programming Methods for Finding Nash Equilibria. AAAI 2005: 495-501 | |

39 | Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki: Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. AAAI 2005: 509-515 | |

38 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Communication complexity of common voting rules. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2005: 78-87 |

37 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of (iterated) dominance. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2005: 88-97 |

36 | EE | Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki: Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. IJCAI 2005: 1668-1669 |

35 | EE | Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki: A New Solution Concept for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. JSAI Workshops 2005: 53-64 |

34 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators. UAI 2005: 145-152 |

2004 | ||

33 | Vincent Conitzer, Jonathan Derryberry, Tuomas Sandholm: Combinatorial Auctions with Structured Item Graphs. AAAI 2004: 212-218 | |

32 | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Computing Shapley Values, Manipulating Value Division Schemes, and Checking Core Membership in Multi-Issue Domains. AAAI 2004: 219-225 | |

31 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: An Algorithm for Automatically Designing Deterministic Mechanisms without Payments. AAMAS 2004: 128-135 |

30 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 132-141 |

29 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Computational criticisms of the revelation principle. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 262-263 |

28 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with vcg payments. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 266-267 |

27 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Expressive negotiation over donations to charities. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 51-60 |

26 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Revenue Failures and Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges with VCG Payments. AMEC 2004: 1-14 |

25 | EE | Paolo Santi, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Towards a Characterization of Polynomial Preference Elicitation with Value Queries in Combinatorial Auctions (Extended Abstract). COLT 2004: 1-16 |

24 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games. ICML 2004 |

2003 | ||

23 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 230-231 |

22 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 232-233 |

21 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting. ICEC 2003: 17-24 |

20 | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents. ICML 2003: 83-90 | |

19 | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games. ICML 2003: 91-98 | |

18 | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems. IJCAI 2003: 1099-1106 | |

17 | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core. IJCAI 2003: 613-618 | |

16 | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria. IJCAI 2003: 765-771 | |

15 | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard. IJCAI 2003: 781-788 | |

14 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Tuomas Sandholm: How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? TARK 2003: 201-214 |

13 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems CoRR cs.AI/0307017: (2003) |

12 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents CoRR cs.GT/0307002: (2003) |

11 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Tuomas Sandholm: How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? CoRR cs.GT/0307003: (2003) |

10 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games CoRR cs.GT/0307006: (2003) |

9 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core CoRR cs.GT/0307016: (2003) |

8 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard CoRR cs.GT/0307018: (2003) |

2002 | ||

7 | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 314-319 | |

6 | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 392-397 | |

5 | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Mechanism Design. UAI 2002: 103-110 | |

4 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness CoRR cs.GT/0205073: (2002) |

3 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria CoRR cs.GT/0205074: (2002) |

2 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Mechanism Design CoRR cs.GT/0205075: (2002) |

1 | EE | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates CoRR cs.GT/0205076: (2002) |

1 | Krzysztof R. Apt | [66] [68] |

2 | Sayan Bhattacharya | [80] |

3 | Craig Boutilier | [59] |

4 | Andrew J. Davenport | [51] |

5 | Jonathan Derryberry | [33] |

6 | Nikesh Garera | [46] |

7 | Andrew Gilpin | [40] |

8 | Mingyu Guo | [63] [66] [68] [71] [75] [76] |

9 | Atsushi Iwasaki | [35] [36] [39] [53] [73] |

10 | Kamal Jain | [67] |

11 | Jayant Kalagnanam | [51] |

12 | Jérôme Lang | [11] [14] [57] [77] |

13 | Joshua Letchford | [67] |

14 | Evangelos Markakis (Vangelis Markakis) | [66] [68] |

15 | Kohki Maruono | [53] |

16 | Kamesh Munagala | [80] |

17 | Naoki Ohta | [35] [36] [39] [53] [73] |

18 | Tuomas Sandholm | [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [45] [47] [48] [49] [50] [53] [56] [57] [59] [60] |

19 | Paolo Santi | [25] [43] |

20 | Yasufumi Satoh | [73] |

21 | Liad Wagman | [74] [79] |

22 | Lirong Xia | [70] [72] [77] [78] [80] |

23 | Makoto Yokoo | [35] [36] [39] [53] [73] |