dblp.uni-trier.dewww.uni-trier.de

Vincent Conitzer

List of publications from the DBLP Bibliography Server - FAQ
Coauthor Index - Ask others: ACM DL/Guide - CiteSeer - CSB - Google - MSN - Yahoo
Home Page

2009
80EESayan Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munagala, Lirong Xia: Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions CoRR abs/0904.3501: (2009)
2008
79 Liad Wagman, Vincent Conitzer: Optimal False-Name-Proof Voting Rules with Costly Voting. AAAI 2008: 190-195
78 Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer: Determining Possible and Necessary Winners under Common Voting Rules Given Partial Orders. AAAI 2008: 196-201
77 Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang: Voting on Multiattribute Domains with Cyclic Preferential Dependencies. AAAI 2008: 202-207
76EEMingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer: Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms. AAMAS (2) 2008: 1039-1046
75EEMingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer: Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms. AAMAS (2) 2008: 1047-1054
74EELiad Wagman, Vincent Conitzer: Strategic betting for competitive agents. AAMAS (2) 2008: 847-854
73EENaoki Ohta, Vincent Conitzer, Yasufumi Satoh, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo: Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments. AAMAS (2) 2008: 927-934
72EELirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer: Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2008: 109-118
71EEMingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer: Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2008: 210-219
70EELirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer: A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2008: 99-108
69EEVincent Conitzer: Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules. WINE 2008: 295-306
68EEKrzysztof R. Apt, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo, Evangelos Markakis: Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms. WINE 2008: 426-437
67EEJoshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer, Kamal Jain: An "Ethical" Game-Theoretic Solution Concept for Two-Player Perfect-Information Games. WINE 2008: 696-707
66EEKrzysztof R. Apt, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo, Evangelos Markakis: Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms CoRR abs/0810.2865: (2008)
2007
65EEVincent Conitzer: Invited talk by winner of IFAAMAS Victor Lesser Distinguished Dissertation Award. AAMAS 2007: 253
64EEVincent Conitzer: Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries. AAMAS 2007: 65
63EEMingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer: Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2007: 30-39
62EEVincent Conitzer: Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules. Computational Social Systems and the Internet 2007
61EEVincent Conitzer: Limited Verification of Identities to Induce False-Name-Proofness. Computational Social Systems and the Internet 2007
60EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Incremental Mechanism Design. IJCAI 2007: 1251-1256
59EETuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer, Craig Boutilier: Automated Design of Multistage Mechanisms. IJCAI 2007: 1500-1506
58EEVincent Conitzer: Limited verification of identities to induce false-name-proofness. TARK 2007: 102-111
57EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Jérôme Lang: When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?. J. ACM 54(3): 14 (2007)
56EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents. Machine Learning 67(1-2): 23-43 (2007)
55EEVincent Conitzer: Editor's introduction. SIGecom Exchanges 7(1): 1-2 (2007)
54EEVincent Conitzer: Editor's puzzle: combinatorial auction winner determination. SIGecom Exchanges 7(1): 69-70 (2007)
2006
53 Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Kohki Maruono, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. AAAI 2006
52 Vincent Conitzer: Computing Slater Rankings Using Similarities among Candidates. AAAI 2006
51 Vincent Conitzer, Andrew J. Davenport, Jayant Kalagnanam: Improved Bounds for Computing Kemeny Rankings. AAAI 2006
50 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate. AAAI 2006
49EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges. AAMAS 2006: 521-528
48EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: A technique for reducing normal-form games to compute a Nash equilibrium. AAMAS 2006: 537-544
47EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Computing the optimal strategy to commit to. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2006: 82-90
46EEVincent Conitzer, Nikesh Garera: Learning algorithms for online principal-agent problems (and selling goods online). ICML 2006: 209-216
45EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions. Artif. Intell. 170(6-7): 607-619 (2006)
2005
44 Vincent Conitzer: Computational Aspects of Mechanism Design. AAAI 2005: 1642-1643
43 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Paolo Santi: Combinatorial Auctions with k-wise Dependent Valuations. AAAI 2005: 248-254
42 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Expressive Negotiation in Settings with Externalities. AAAI 2005: 255-260
41 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: A Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion and Computational Methods for Applying It. AAAI 2005: 483-488
40 Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin, Vincent Conitzer: Mixed-Integer Programming Methods for Finding Nash Equilibria. AAAI 2005: 495-501
39 Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki: Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. AAAI 2005: 509-515
38EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Communication complexity of common voting rules. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2005: 78-87
37EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of (iterated) dominance. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2005: 88-97
36EEMakoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki: Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. IJCAI 2005: 1668-1669
35EEMakoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki: A New Solution Concept for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. JSAI Workshops 2005: 53-64
34EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators. UAI 2005: 145-152
2004
33 Vincent Conitzer, Jonathan Derryberry, Tuomas Sandholm: Combinatorial Auctions with Structured Item Graphs. AAAI 2004: 212-218
32 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Computing Shapley Values, Manipulating Value Division Schemes, and Checking Core Membership in Multi-Issue Domains. AAAI 2004: 219-225
31EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: An Algorithm for Automatically Designing Deterministic Mechanisms without Payments. AAMAS 2004: 128-135
30EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 132-141
29EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Computational criticisms of the revelation principle. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 262-263
28EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with vcg payments. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 266-267
27EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Expressive negotiation over donations to charities. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 51-60
26EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Revenue Failures and Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges with VCG Payments. AMEC 2004: 1-14
25EEPaolo Santi, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Towards a Characterization of Polynomial Preference Elicitation with Value Queries in Combinatorial Auctions (Extended Abstract). COLT 2004: 1-16
24EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games. ICML 2004
2003
23EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 230-231
22EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 232-233
21EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting. ICEC 2003: 17-24
20 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents. ICML 2003: 83-90
19 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games. ICML 2003: 91-98
18 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems. IJCAI 2003: 1099-1106
17 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core. IJCAI 2003: 613-618
16 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria. IJCAI 2003: 765-771
15 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard. IJCAI 2003: 781-788
14EEVincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Tuomas Sandholm: How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? TARK 2003: 201-214
13EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems CoRR cs.AI/0307017: (2003)
12EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents CoRR cs.GT/0307002: (2003)
11EEVincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Tuomas Sandholm: How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? CoRR cs.GT/0307003: (2003)
10EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games CoRR cs.GT/0307006: (2003)
9EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core CoRR cs.GT/0307016: (2003)
8EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard CoRR cs.GT/0307018: (2003)
2002
7 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 314-319
6 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 392-397
5 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Mechanism Design. UAI 2002: 103-110
4EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness CoRR cs.GT/0205073: (2002)
3EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria CoRR cs.GT/0205074: (2002)
2EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Mechanism Design CoRR cs.GT/0205075: (2002)
1EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates CoRR cs.GT/0205076: (2002)

Coauthor Index

1Krzysztof R. Apt [66] [68]
2Sayan Bhattacharya [80]
3Craig Boutilier [59]
4Andrew J. Davenport [51]
5Jonathan Derryberry [33]
6Nikesh Garera [46]
7Andrew Gilpin [40]
8Mingyu Guo [63] [66] [68] [71] [75] [76]
9Atsushi Iwasaki [35] [36] [39] [53] [73]
10Kamal Jain [67]
11Jayant Kalagnanam [51]
12Jérôme Lang [11] [14] [57] [77]
13Joshua Letchford [67]
14Evangelos Markakis (Vangelis Markakis) [66] [68]
15Kohki Maruono [53]
16Kamesh Munagala [80]
17Naoki Ohta [35] [36] [39] [53] [73]
18Tuomas Sandholm [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [45] [47] [48] [49] [50] [53] [56] [57] [59] [60]
19Paolo Santi [25] [43]
20Yasufumi Satoh [73]
21Liad Wagman [74] [79]
22Lirong Xia [70] [72] [77] [78] [80]
23Makoto Yokoo [35] [36] [39] [53] [73]

Colors in the list of coauthors

Copyright © Sun May 17 03:24:02 2009 by Michael Ley (ley@uni-trier.de)