2009 |
34 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Felix A. Fischer,
Paul Harrenstein,
Yoav Shoham:
Ranking games.
Artif. Intell. 173(2): 221-239 (2009) |
33 | EE | Dorothea Baumeister,
Felix Brandt,
Felix A. Fischer,
Jörg Rothe:
Deciding Membership in Minimal Upward Covering Sets is Complete for Parallel Access to NP
CoRR abs/0901.3692: (2009) |
32 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Felix Fischer,
Markus Holzer:
Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium.
J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 75(3): 163-177 (2009) |
2008 |
31 | | Felix Brandt,
Felix A. Fischer,
Paul Harrenstein,
Maximilian Mair:
A Computational Analysis of the Tournament Equilibrium Set.
AAAI 2008: 38-43 |
30 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Felix A. Fischer:
On the Hardness and Existence of Quasi-Strict Equilibria.
SAGT 2008: 291-302 |
29 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Felix A. Fischer,
Markus Holzer:
Equilibria of Graphical Games with Symmetries.
WINE 2008: 198-209 |
28 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Tuomas Sandholm:
On the Existence of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auction Protocols.
ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 11(2): (2008) |
27 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Felix A. Fischer,
Markus Holzer:
On Iterated Dominance, Matrix Elimination, and Matched Paths.
Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC) 15(077): (2008) |
26 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Felix A. Fischer:
Computing the minimal covering set.
Mathematical Social Sciences 56(2): 254-268 (2008) |
2007 |
25 | | Felix Brandt,
Felix A. Fischer:
Computational Aspects of Covering in Dominance Graphs.
AAAI 2007: 694-699 |
24 | EE | Paul Harrenstein,
Felix Brandt,
Felix A. Fischer:
Commitment and extortion.
AAMAS 2007: 26 |
23 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Felix A. Fischer,
Paul Harrenstein,
Yoav Shoham:
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Strictly Competitive Multiagent Scenarios.
IJCAI 2007: 1199-1206 |
22 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Yoav Shoham:
Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions.
IJCAI 2007: 1207-1214 |
21 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Felix A. Fischer,
Markus Holzer:
Symmetries and the Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibrium.
STACS 2007: 212-223 |
20 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Felix A. Fischer,
Paul Harrenstein:
The computational complexity of choice sets.
TARK 2007: 82-91 |
19 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Felix A. Fischer:
PageRank as a Weak Tournament Solution.
WINE 2007: 300-305 |
18 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Felix A. Fischer,
Paul Harrenstein:
Recognizing Members of the Tournament Equilibrium Set is NP-hard
CoRR abs/0711.2961: (2007) |
17 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Felix A. Fischer,
Markus Holzer:
Equilibria of Graphical Games with Symmetries.
Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC) 14(136): (2007) |
2006 |
16 | | Felix Brandt,
Felix A. Fischer,
Yoav Shoham:
On Strictly Competitive Multi-Player Games.
AAAI 2006 |
15 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Felix A. Fischer,
Markus Holzer:
Symmetries and the Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibrium.
Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC) 13(091): (2006) |
14 | EE | Felix Brandt:
How to obtain full privacy in auctions.
Int. J. Inf. Sec. 5(4): 201-216 (2006) |
2005 |
13 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Decentralized voting with unconditional privacy.
AAMAS 2005: 357-364 |
12 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Tuomas Sandholm,
Yoav Shoham:
Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions.
Computing and Markets 2005 |
11 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Efficient Privacy-Preserving Protocols for Multi-unit Auctions.
Financial Cryptography 2005: 298-312 |
10 | EE | Felix Brandt:
Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Design Based on Distributed El Gamal Encryption.
ICISC 2005: 32-47 |
9 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Unconditional privacy in social choice.
TARK 2005: 207-218 |
2004 |
8 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Tuomas Sandholm:
Im)Possibility of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auctions.
AAMAS 2004: 810-817 |
2003 |
7 | EE | Felix Brandt:
Social choice and preference protection: towards fully private mechanism design.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 220-221 |
6 | EE | Felix Brandt:
Fully Private Auctions in a Constant Number of Rounds.
Financial Cryptography 2003: 223-238 |
2001 |
5 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Gerhard Weiß:
Antisocial Agents and Vickrey Auctions.
ATAL 2001: 335-347 |
4 | EE | Felix Brandt,
Gerhard Weiß:
Vicious strategies for Vickrey auctions.
Agents 2001: 71-72 |
3 | EE | Felix Brandt:
Cryptographic Protocols for Secure Second-Price Auctions.
CIA 2001: 154-165 |
2000 |
2 | | Felix Brandt,
Wilfried Brauer,
Gerhard Weiß:
Task Assignment in Multiagent Systems Based on Vickrey-Type Auctioning and Leveled Commitment Contracting.
CIA 2000: 95-106 |
1999 |
1 | | Stephan Schulz,
Felix Brandt:
Using Term Space Maps to Capture Search Control Knowledge in Equational Theorem Proving.
FLAIRS Conference 1999: 244-248 |