9. ACM-EC 2008: Chicago, IL, USA

Sponsored search

• Kevin Bartz, Cory Barr, Adil Aijaz:
  Natural language generation for sponsored-search advertisements. 1-9
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Azarakhsh Malekian, Chi-Chao Chang, Ravi Kumar, Grant Wang:
  Optimizing query rewrites for keyword-based advertising. 10-19
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Kartik Hosanagar, Vadim Cherepanov:
  Optimal bidding in stochastic budget constrained slot auctions. 20
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX

Characterizing incentive compatibility

• Aaron Archer, Robert Kleinberg:
  Truthful germs are contagious: a local to global characterization of truthfulness. 21-30
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Ahuva Mu'alem, Michael Schapira:
  Mechanism design over discrete domains. 31-37
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Shahar Dobzinski, Mukund Sundararajan:
  On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling. 38-47
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Dov Monderer:
  Monotonicity and implementability: extended abstract. 48
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX

Pricing

• Liad Blumrosen, Thomas Holenstein:
  Posted prices vs. negotiations: an asymptotic analysis. 49
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Yishay Mansour:
  Item pricing for revenue maximization. 50-59
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Ning Chen, Arpita Ghosh, Sergei Vassilvitskii:
  Optimal envy-free pricing with metric substitutability. 60-69
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX

Communication complexity in mechanisms

• Vahab S. Mirrokni, Michael Schapira, Jan Vondrák:
  Tight information-theoretic lower bounds for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions. 70-77
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes:
  On the communication requirements of verifying the VCG outcome. 78-87
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, Moni Naor, Michael Schapira:
  Informational overhead of incentive compatibility. 88-97
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Maher Said:
  Information revelation and random entry in sequential ascending auctions. 98
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX

Eliciting the truth and worrying about lying

• Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer:
  A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable. 99-108
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer:
  Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability. 109-118
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings:
  Incentives for expressing opinions in online polls. 119-128
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Nicolas S. Lambert, David M. Pennock, Yoav Shoham:
  Eliciting properties of probability distributions. 129-138
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Lance Fortnow, Rakesh Vohra:
  The complexity of forecast testing: abstract. 139
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX

Networks

• Po-An Chen, David Kempe:
  Altruism, selfishness, and spite in traffic routing. 140-149
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• J. Stephen Judd, Michael Kearns:
  Behavioral experiments in networked trade. 150-159
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Jens Grossklags, Nicolas Christin, John Chuang:
  Security and insurance management in networks with heterogeneous agents. 160-169
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX

Prediction markets

• Nicolas S. Lambert, John Langford, Jennifer Wortman, Yiling Chen, Daniel M. Reeves, Yoav Shoham, David M. Pennock:
  Self-financed wagering mechanisms for forecasting. 170-179
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Mohammad Ghodsi, Hamid Mahini, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Morteza Zadimoghaddam:
  Permutation betting markets: singleton betting with extra information. 180-189
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Yiling Chen, Lance Fortnow, Nicolas S. Lambert, David M. Pennock, Jennifer Wortman:
  Complexity of combinatorial market makers. 190-199
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Stanko Dimitrov, Rahul Sami:
  Non-myopic strategies in prediction markets. 200-209
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX

Economic redistribution

• Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer:
  Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand. 210-219
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Ruggiero Cavallo:
  Efficiency and redistribution in dynamic mechanism design. 220-229
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Jiyong Zhang, Nicolas Jones, Pearl Pu:
  A visual interface for critiquing-based recommender systems. 230-239
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Fang Wu, Bernardo A. Huberman:
  Popularity, novelty and attention. 240-245
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Jiang Yang, Lada A. Adamic, Mark S. Ackerman:
  Crowdsourcing and knowledge sharing: strategic user behavior on taskcn. 246-255
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX

Convergence to, and robustness of, solutions

• Heiner Ackermann, Paul W. Goldberg, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Heiko Röglin, Berthold Vöcking:
  Uncoordinated two-sided matching markets. 256-263
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Baruch Awerbuch, Yossi Azar, Amir Epstein, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Alexander Skopalik:
  Fast convergence to nearly optimal solutions in potential games. 264-273
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Ronen Gradwohl, Omer Reingold:
  Fault tolerance in large games. 274-283
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX

Social networks and peer production

• Jon M. Kleinberg, Siddharth Suri, Éva Tardos, Tom Wexler:
  Strategic network formation with structural holes. 284-293
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Dominic Meier, Yvonne Anne Oswald, Stefan Schmid, Roger Wattenhofer:
  On the windfall of friendship: inoculation strategies on social networks. 294-301
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Dennis M. Wilkinson:
  Strong regularities in online peer production. 302-309
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Haifeng Liu, Ee-Peng Lim, Hady Wirawan Lauw, Minh-Tam Le, Aixin Sun, Jaideep Srivastava, Young Ae Kim:
  Predicting trusts among users of online communities: an epinions case study. 310-319
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX