| 2008 |
|---|
| 13 | EE | Ahuva Mu'alem,
Michael Schapira:
Mechanism design over discrete domains.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2008: 31-37 |
| 12 | EE | Vahab S. Mirrokni,
Michael Schapira,
Jan Vondrák:
Tight information-theoretic lower bounds for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2008: 70-77 |
| 11 | EE | Moshe Babaioff,
Liad Blumrosen,
Moni Naor,
Michael Schapira:
Informational overhead of incentive compatibility.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2008: 88-97 |
| 10 | EE | Christos H. Papadimitriou,
Michael Schapira,
Yaron Singer:
On the Hardness of Being Truthful.
FOCS 2008: 250-259 |
| 9 | EE | George Christodoulou,
Annamária Kovács,
Michael Schapira:
Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions.
ICALP (1) 2008: 820-832 |
| 8 | EE | Hagay Levin,
Michael Schapira,
Aviv Zohar:
Interdomain routing and games.
STOC 2008: 57-66 |
| 7 | EE | Michael Schapira,
Yaron Singer:
Inapproximability of Combinatorial Public Projects.
WINE 2008: 351-361 |
| 6 | EE | Noam Nisan,
Michael Schapira,
Aviv Zohar:
Asynchronous Best-Reply Dynamics.
WINE 2008: 531-538 |
| 2007 |
|---|
| 5 | EE | Ahuva Mu'alem,
Michael Schapira:
Setting lower bounds on truthfulness: extended abstract.
SODA 2007: 1143-1152 |
| 2006 |
|---|
| 4 | EE | Joan Feigenbaum,
Vijay Ramachandran,
Michael Schapira:
Incentive-compatible interdomain routing.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2006: 130-139 |
| 3 | EE | Shahar Dobzinski,
Michael Schapira:
An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders.
SODA 2006: 1064-1073 |
| 2 | EE | Shahar Dobzinski,
Noam Nisan,
Michael Schapira:
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions.
STOC 2006: 644-652 |
| 2005 |
|---|
| 1 | EE | Shahar Dobzinski,
Noam Nisan,
Michael Schapira:
Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders.
STOC 2005: 610-618 |
