Shahar Dobzinski

2009
17	EE	Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin Dughmi: On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design CoRR abs/0904.4193: (2009)
2008
16	EE	Shahar Dobzinski, Mukund Sundararajan: On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2008: 38-47
15	EE	Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden: Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents. FOCS 2008: 15-24
14	EE	Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan: Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits. FOCS 2008: 260-269
13	EE	Richard Cole, Shahar Dobzinski, Lisa Fleischer: Prompt Mechanisms for Online Auctions. SAGT 2008: 170-181
12	EE	Shahar Dobzinski, Aranyak Mehta, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan: Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal? SAGT 2008: 327-336
11	EE	Shahar Dobzinski, Ariel D. Procaccia: Frequent Manipulability of Elections: The Case of Two Voters. WINE 2008: 653-664
2007
10	EE	Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan: Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2007: 346-351
9	EE	Shahar Dobzinski: Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions. APPROX-RANDOM 2007: 89-103
8	EE	Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan: Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms. STOC 2007: 338-344
7	EE	Liad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski: Welfare Maximization in Congestion Games. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 25(6): 1224-1236 (2007)
6	EE	Shahar Dobzinski: Better mechanisms for combinatorial auctions via maximal-in-range algorithms? SIGecom Exchanges 7(1): 30-33 (2007)
2006
5	EE	Liad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski: Welfare maximization in congestion games. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2006: 52-61
4	EE	Shahar Dobzinski, Michael Schapira: An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. SODA 2006: 1064-1073
3	EE	Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira: Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. STOC 2006: 644-652
2	EE	Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan: Approximations by Computationally-Efficient VCG-Based Mechanisms. Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC) 13(074): (2006)
2005
1	EE	Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira: Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders. STOC 2005: 610-618

Coauthor Index

1	Liad Blumrosen	[5] [7]
2	Richard Cole	[13]
3	Peerapong Dhangwatnotai	[15]
4	Shaddin Dughmi	[15] [17]
5	Lisa Fleischer	[13]
6	Ron Lavi	[14]
7	Aranyak Mehta	[12]
8	Noam Nisan	[1] [2] [3] [8] [10] [14]
9	Ariel D. Procaccia	[11]
10	Tim Roughgarden	[12] [15]
11	Michael Schapira	[1] [3] [4]
12	Mukund Sundararajan	[12] [16]

Colors in the list of coauthors