2008 |
28 | EE | Matthew Cary,
Abraham D. Flaxman,
Jason D. Hartline,
Anna R. Karlin:
Auctions for structured procurement.
SODA 2008: 304-313 |
27 | EE | Jason D. Hartline,
Tim Roughgarden:
Optimal mechanism design and money burning.
STOC 2008: 75-84 |
26 | EE | Jason D. Hartline,
Vahab S. Mirrokni,
Mukund Sundararajan:
Optimal marketing strategies over social networks.
WWW 2008: 189-198 |
25 | EE | Jason D. Hartline,
Tim Roughgarden:
Optimal Mechansim Design and Money Burning
CoRR abs/0804.2097: (2008) |
24 | EE | Shuchi Chawla,
Jason D. Hartline,
Robert Kleinberg:
Algorithmic Pricing via Virtual Valuations
CoRR abs/0808.1671: (2008) |
23 | EE | Maria-Florina Balcan,
Avrim Blum,
Jason D. Hartline,
Yishay Mansour:
Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning.
J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 74(8): 1245-1270 (2008) |
2007 |
22 | EE | Shuchi Chawla,
Jason D. Hartline,
Robert D. Kleinberg:
Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2007: 243-251 |
2006 |
21 | EE | Gagan Aggarwal,
Jason D. Hartline:
Knapsack auctions.
SODA 2006: 1083-1092 |
20 | EE | Shuchi Chawla,
Jason D. Hartline,
Uday Rajan,
R. Ravi:
Bayesian Optimal No-Deficit Mechanism Design.
WINE 2006: 136-148 |
2005 |
19 | EE | Jason D. Hartline,
Robert McGrew:
From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctions.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2005: 175-182 |
18 | EE | Maria-Florina Balcan,
Avrim Blum,
Jason D. Hartline,
Yishay Mansour:
Mechanism Design via Machine Learning.
FOCS 2005: 605-614 |
17 | EE | Avrim Blum,
Jason D. Hartline:
Near-optimal online auctions.
SODA 2005: 1156-1163 |
16 | EE | Venkatesan Guruswami,
Jason D. Hartline,
Anna R. Karlin,
David Kempe,
Claire Kenyon,
Frank McSherry:
On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing.
SODA 2005: 1164-1173 |
15 | EE | Andrew V. Goldberg,
Jason D. Hartline:
Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents.
SODA 2005: 620-629 |
14 | EE | Gagan Aggarwal,
Amos Fiat,
Andrew V. Goldberg,
Jason D. Hartline,
Nicole Immorlica,
Madhu Sudan:
Derandomization of auctions.
STOC 2005: 619-625 |
13 | EE | Jason D. Hartline,
Vladlen Koltun:
Near-Optimal Pricing in Near-Linear Time.
WADS 2005: 422-431 |
12 | EE | Uriel Feige,
Abraham Flaxman,
Jason D. Hartline,
Robert D. Kleinberg:
On the Competitive Ratio of the Random Sampling Auction.
WINE 2005: 878-886 |
11 | EE | Jason D. Hartline,
Edwin S. Hong,
Alexander E. Mohr,
William R. Pentney,
Emily Rocke:
Characterizing History Independent Data Structures.
Algorithmica 42(1): 57-74 (2005) |
2004 |
10 | EE | Andrew V. Goldberg,
Jason D. Hartline,
Anna R. Karlin,
Michael E. Saks:
A Lower Bound on the Competitive Ratio of Truthful Auctions.
STACS 2004: 644-655 |
2003 |
9 | EE | Andrew V. Goldberg,
Jason D. Hartline:
Envy-free auctions for digital goods.
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 29-35 |
8 | EE | Andrew V. Goldberg,
Jason D. Hartline:
Competitiveness via consensus.
SODA 2003: 215-222 |
2002 |
7 | EE | Kaustubh Deshmukh,
Andrew V. Goldberg,
Jason D. Hartline,
Anna R. Karlin:
Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions.
ESA 2002: 361-373 |
6 | EE | Jason D. Hartline,
Edwin S. Hong,
Alexander E. Mohr,
William R. Pentney,
Emily Rocke:
Characterizing History Independent Data Structures.
ISAAC 2002: 229-240 |
5 | EE | Amos Fiat,
Andrew V. Goldberg,
Jason D. Hartline,
Anna R. Karlin:
Competitive generalized auctions.
STOC 2002: 72-81 |
2001 |
4 | EE | Eric J. Anderson,
Joseph Hall,
Jason D. Hartline,
Michael Hobbs,
Anna R. Karlin,
Jared Saia,
Ram Swaminathan,
John Wilkes:
An Experimental Study of Data Migration Algorithms.
Algorithm Engineering 2001: 145-158 |
3 | EE | Andrew V. Goldberg,
Jason D. Hartline:
Competitive Auctions for Multiple Digital Goods.
ESA 2001: 416-427 |
2 | EE | Joseph Hall,
Jason D. Hartline,
Anna R. Karlin,
Jared Saia,
John Wilkes:
On algorithms for efficient data migration.
SODA 2001: 620-629 |
1 | EE | Andrew V. Goldberg,
Jason D. Hartline,
Andrew Wright:
Competitive auctions and digital goods.
SODA 2001: 735-744 |