2. WINE 2006: Patras, Greece

• Abraham Neyman:
  Recent Developments in Learning and Competition with Finite Automata (Extended Abstract). 1-2
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• Davide Bilò, Luciano Gualà, Guido Proietti:
  Dynamic Mechanism Design. 3-15
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• Tian-Ming Bu, Qi Qi, Aries Wei Sun:
  Unconditional Competitive Auctions with Copy and Budget Constraints. 16-26
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• Pinyan Lu, Shang-Hua Teng, Changyuan Yu:
  Truthful Auctions with Optimal Profit. 27-36
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• Carmine Ventre:
  Mechanisms with Verification for Any Finite Domain. 37-49
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• Heiner Ackermann, Heiko Röglin, Berthold Vöcking:
  Pure Nash Equilibria in Player-Specific and Weighted Congestion Games. 50-61
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• Juliane Dunkel, Andreas S. Schulz:
  On the Complexity of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria in Congestion and Local-Effect Games. 62-73
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• Ola Rozenfeld, Moshe Tennenholtz:
  Strong and Correlated Strong Equilibria in Monotone Congestion Games. 74-86
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• Igal Milchtaich:
  The Equilibrium Existence Problem in Finite Network Congestion Games. 87-98
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• Abraham Flaxman, David Gamarnik, Gregory B. Sorkin:
  First-Passage Percolation on a Width-2 Strip and the Path Cost in a VCG Auction. 99-111
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• Shuchi Chawla, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan:
  Optimal Cost-Sharing Mechanisms for Steiner Forest Problems. 112-123
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• Antoniy Ganchev, Lata Narayanan, Sunil M. Shende:
  Mechanisms to Induce Random Choice. 124-135
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• Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Uday Rajan, R. Ravi:
  Bayesian Optimal No-Deficit Mechanism Design. 136-148
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• Mihalis Yannakakis:
  Succinct Approximation of Trade-Off Curves. 149
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• Nicole Immorlica, Kamal Jain, Mohammad Mahdian:
  Game-Theoretic Aspects of Designing Hyperlink Structures. 150-161
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• Pradeep Dubey, Rahul Garg, Bernard De Meyer:
  Competing for Customers in a Social Network: The Quasi-linear Case. 162-173
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• Jean Cardinal, Martin Hoefer:
  Selfish Service Installation in Networks. 174-185
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• Pradeep Dubey, Rahul Garg:
  Games of Connectivity. 186-197
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• David Abraham, Ning Chen, Vijay Kumar, Vahab S. Mirrokni:
  Assignment Problems in Rental Markets. 198-213
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• Ping Li, Hou-Sheng Chen, Guang-Dong Huang, Xiao-Jun Shi:
  On Portfolio's Default-Risk-Adjusted Duration and Value: Model and Algorithm Based on Copulas. 214-224
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• Rahul Garg, Sanjiv Kapoor:
  Price Roll-Backs and Path Auctions: An Approximation Scheme for Computing the Market Equilibrium. 225-238
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• Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Nikhil R. Devanur, Vijay V. Vazirani:
  New Results on Rationality and Strongly Polynomial Time Solvability in Eisenberg-Gale Markets. 239-250
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• Xiaotie Deng:
  Making Economic Theory Operational. 251-261
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• Xi Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Shang-Hua Teng:
  Sparse Games Are Hard. 262-273
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• Xi Chen, Li-Sha Huang, Shang-Hua Teng:
  Market Equilibria with Hybrid Linear-Leontief Utilities. 274-285
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• Spyros C. Kontogiannis, Panagiota N. Panagopoulou, Paul G. Spirakis:
  Polynomial Algorithms for Approximating Nash Equilibria of Bimatrix Games. 286-296
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• Constantinos Daskalakis, Aranyak Mehta, Christos H. Papadimitriou:
  A Note on Approximate Nash Equilibria. 297-306
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• Dorit S. Hochbaum:
  Ranking Sports Teams and the Inverse Equal Paths Problem. 307-318
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• Dominic Dumrauf, Martin Gairing:
  Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Wardrop Games. 319-330
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• Vladimir Mazalov, Burkhard Monien, Florian Schoppmann, Karsten Tiemann:
  Wardrop Equilibria and Price of Stability for Bottleneck Games with Splittable Traffic. 331-342
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• T. Komninos, Yannis C. Stamatiou, G. Vavitsas:
  A Worm Propagation Model Based on People's Email Acquaintance Profiles. 343-352
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• Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan:
  Mixed Strategies in Combinatorial Agency. 353-364
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• Mikolaj Morzy, Adam Wierzbicki:
  The Sound of Silence: Mining Implicit Feedbacks to Compute Reputation. 365-376
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• Paolo Penna, Guido Proietti, Peter Widmayer:
  Strongly Polynomial-Time Truthful Mechanisms in One Shot. 377-388
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• Nicole Immorlica, Robert D. Kleinberg, Mohammad Mahdian:
  Secretary Problems with Competing Employers. 389-400
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