Mathematical Social Sciences, Volume 3

Volume 3, Number 1, July 1982

• Eitan Muller:
  On the existence of an arrow and a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function. 1-7
  Electronic Edition (link) BibTeX
• Norman Schofield:
  Bargaining set theory and stability in coalition governments. 9-32
  Electronic Edition (link) BibTeX
• Murray C. Kemp, Yew-Kwang Ng:
  The incompatibility of individualism and ordinalism. 33-37
  Electronic Edition (link) BibTeX
• A. A. J. Marley:
  Random utility models with all choice probabilities expressible as 'functions' of the binary choice probabilities. 39-56
  Electronic Edition (link) BibTeX
• Thomas Schwartz:
  No minimally reasonable collective-choice process can be strategy-proof. 57-72
  Electronic Edition (link) BibTeX
• Peter C. Fishburn:
  Relative probabilities of majority winners under partial information. 73-78
  Electronic Edition (link) BibTeX
• Jean-Pierre Barthélemy:
  Arrow's theorem: unusual domains and extended codomains. 79-89
  Electronic Edition (link) BibTeX

Volume 3, Number 2, September 1982

• Ki Hang Kim:
  Juche in international trade. 99-107
  Electronic Edition (link) BibTeX
• David J. Mayston:
  The generation of a social welfare function under ordinal preferences. 109-129
  Electronic Edition (link) BibTeX
• Kotaro Suzumura:
  Equity, efficiency and rights in social choice. 131-155
  Electronic Edition (link) BibTeX
• Alvin E. Roth, Michael W. K. Malouf:
  Scale changes and shared information in bargaining: An experimental study. 157-177
  Electronic Edition (link) BibTeX
• John C. Harsanyi:
  Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory, part I : Theoretical preliminaries. 179-191
  Electronic Edition (link) BibTeX
• Mamoru Kaneko:
  The optimal progressive income tax : The existence and the limit tax rates. 193-221
  Electronic Edition (link) BibTeX

Volume 3, Number 3, October 1982

• Mitsuhiko Toda, Kozo Sugiyama, Shojiro Tagawa:
  A method for aggregating ordinal assessments by a majority decision rule. 227-242
  Electronic Edition (link) BibTeX
• Hervé Moulin:
  Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results. 243-257
  Electronic Edition (link) BibTeX
• John C. Harsanyi:
  Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory, part II : Analysis of specific bargaining games. 259-279
  Electronic Edition (link) BibTeX
• Mamoru Kaneko:
  Some remarks on the folk theorem in game theory. 281-290
  Electronic Edition (link) BibTeX
• Linton C. Freeman:
  Centered graphs and the structure of ego networks. 291-304
  Electronic Edition (link) BibTeX
• Ki Hang Kim, Fred W. Roush:
  Juche versus Sadae: Game-theoretic approach. 305-310
  Electronic Edition (link) BibTeX

Volume 3, Number 4, December 1982

• Mamoru Kaneko, Myrna Holtz Wooders:
  Cores of partitioning games. 313-327
  Electronic Edition (link) BibTeX
• Peter S. Albin:
  The metalogic of economic predictions, calculations and propositions. 329-358
  Electronic Edition (link) BibTeX
• Fred W. Roush:
  Retrospective survey: Kenjiro Nakamura (1947-1979). 359-362
  Electronic Edition (link) BibTeX
• Hans W. Gottinger:
  Foundations of lexicographic utility. 363-371
  Electronic Edition (link) BibTeX
• Steven J. Brams, Morton D. Davis:
  Optimal resource allocation in presidential primaries. 373-388
  Electronic Edition (link) BibTeX
• Gabrielle Demange:
  Single-peaked orders on a tree. 389-396
  Electronic Edition (link) BibTeX
• Christopher H. Nevison:
  Structural satisfaction in simple games. 397-401
  Electronic Edition (link) BibTeX